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PRECLUDING APPEALS
Judith Resniktt

Over the past forty years, we have vastly increased our information about courts. New methods of recordkeeping have led to a
wealth of statistics about court processes.' This new information
has, in turn, increased concern about burgeoning litigation rates
and the limits ofjudicial and litigants' resources. The resulting per-

ceptions of congestion and of systemic malfunctioning have led, in
general, to two related developments, each pointing in a different
direction. The first is a cutback-limiting access to adjudication by
developing expansive preclusion doctrines. The second develop-

ment is an increase in adjudicative tribunals and thus in the opportunities to have many issues decided by more than one set of
decisionmakers.
As to the first development, the cutback, the Supreme Court
has led the way. During the past several years, in diverse fields of
law, the Court has narrowed litigation opportunities. A series of examples are cases involving the relationship between state and federal litigation. Opinions such as Stone v. Powell,2 Wainwright v. Sykes, 3
and Engle v. Issac4 all involve interpretations of the habeas corpus act
tt
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1
The sophistication of court recordkeeping has increased substantially since the
creation of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts in 1939. See, e.g., DIRECTOR ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTs. ANN. REP. (1984) (appearing with JUD. CONF. U.S. PROC.
REP. 1984)). See also STATISTICAL ANALYSIS & REPORTS DIVISION, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE
U.S. CTS., FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATIsTICs: DURING THE TWELVE MONTH PE-

RIOD ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1983 (1984) (for federal data); COURT STATISTICS & INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PROJECT, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE
CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1979 (1984) (for state data).

COURT

2 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (when state has provided opportunity for full and fair litigation of fourth amendment claims, state prisoner may not obtain federal habeas relief on
ground that evidence was obtained through unconstitutional search and seizure).
3 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (absent cause and prejudice, failure to make timely objection
to admission of inculpatory statement, as required by state rule, precludes federal
habeas review).
4 456 U.S. 107 (1982) (absent cause and prejudice, failure to raise timely constitutional objection to jury instructions in state court precludes federal habeas review).

603

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:603

for state prisoners; in all, the Court precluded habeas review. 5 A
second line of cases includes Allen v. McCurry6 and Migra v. Warren
City School District Board of Education,7 both of which held that state
criminal or civil litigation precluded federal civil rights litigation.
Another exemplary opinion is Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.,8
which limited the number of occasions for factfinding in title VII
cases. Within a unitary framework, the federal system, this theme
has been repeated. In United States v. Frady,9 the Court narrowed
decisionmaking opportunities for federal prisoners seeking habeas
relief. In United States v. Raddatz, 10 the Court permitted a limited
role for federal judges who adopt magistrates' recommended opinions. Finally, the Pullman-Standardv. Swint1 1 opinion set forth a minimal scope of appellate review of federal trial judges' factfinding.
All of these cases involved multiple opportunities for litigation in
federal courts, federal and state courts, or courts and agencies. In
every case, the Court chose less decisionmaking and fewer, rather
12
than more, procedural opportunities.
At the same time that the cutback, caused by new interpretations of preclusion doctrines, is occurring, there is also an expansion of decisionmaking opportunities. Across the country, in both
state and federal systems, the number of adjudicatory institutions
and personnel auxiliary to courts is growing. Today, business in socalled "alternative dispute resolution" is booming. Medical malpractice panels, mandatory court-annexed arbitration schemes,
magistrates, special masters, and agency hearing officers proliferate. 13 These new adjudicatory facilities are being created with the
See supra notes 2-4.
449 U.S. 90 (1980) (federal litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be precluded
by state court criminal judgment).
7
104 S. Ct. 892 (1984) (state court judgment has same preclusive effect, with respect to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, in federal court as judgment would have in state court).
8 456 U.S. 461 (1982) (preclusive effect given to state court decision holding state
agency's rejection of title VII claim as neither arbitrary nor capricious).
9 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (to obtain collateral relief based on claim of unconstitutional jury instructions not objected to at the time, federal prisoner must show both
cause and actual prejudice, rather than plain error).
10 447 U.S. 667 (1980) (federal district judge, considering "de novo" the findings
of a magistrate made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), is not required to rehear testimony
on which magistrate based the findings if the findings are accepted).
11 456 U.S. 273 (1982) (under § 703(h) of 1964 Civil Rights Act, question of intent
is one of fact, to be reviewed by federal appellate courts under the clearly erroneous
standard) of FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
12 There are a few exceptions. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 104 S. Ct.
1949 (1984) (authorizing independent appellate review of trial record in libel cases);
McDonald v. City of West Beach, 104 S. Ct. 1799 (1984) (an unappealed arbitration
award is not preclusive in a subsequent federal civil rights action).
13
See generally DxsPtrrE RESOLUION (Fall 1984) (summary by ABA Special Comm.
on Dispute Resolution of alternative dispute resolution programs throughout nation).
California's mandatory arbitration is analyzed in D. HENSLER, A. LiPSON & E. ROLPH,
5
6
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hope that, by siphoning off some work ofjudges and shifting it elsewhere, disputants will not request deliberation by judges. But, to
avoid political and legal battles (about the constitutionality of limiting access to jury trials and to "real" judges14 ), these auxiliary institutions have remained just that-add-ons, not replacements.
Ironically, many of the "alternatives" themselves add tiers or levels
of decisionmaking-from arbitration to jury, from magistrate to federaljudge, from state agency to federal agency, and from agency to
court. At each step along the way, questions of preclusion arise.
Which tier's decision should endure? How much power should the
first tier have?
The Supreme Court has been answering this new array of preclusion questions by developing "transubstantive rules."' 5 Regardless of the substantive issues, the capacity of first tier
decisionmakers, or the identity of claimants, the Court has almost
always 16 taken a unidimensional approach and precluded additional
decisionmaking.
The logical extension of the Court's preclusion jurisprudence
recently became plain when Justice Rehnquist, in a speech at the
University of Florida College of Law,17 commented that "we have an
obsessive concern that the result reached in a particular case be the
right one." 1 8 Arguing that we are paying too great a price, "in
terms of lawyers' time, speedy disposition and finality," the Justice
urged that "perhaps, speaking of the federal system, the time has
come to abolish appeal as a matter of right from the district courts
to the courts of appeals, and allow such review only when it is
JUDICIAL ARIBTRATION IN CALIFORNIA: THE FIRST YEAR (1981) and in E. ROLPH
HENSTLER, COURT-ORDERED ARBITRATION: THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE (1984).

& D.

14 Compare Parker v. Children's Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978) (requirement that claimant must first arbitrate before requesting relief in courts, authorized to
undertake a de novo review, does not usurp court's power under Pennsylvania Constitution) with Matos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980) (provision of original
exclusive jurisdiction to arbitration panels is unconstitutional because of resulting oppressive delay and infringement on the right to trial by jury) (both cases analyze Pennsylvania's Health Care Services Malpractice Act, 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301.101 to
.1006 (Purdon 1982)).
15 This term comes from Cover, ForJames Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of
the Rules, 84 YALE LJ. 718 (1975).
16 See cases cited supra note 12; see also United States v. Mendoza, 104 S.Ct. 568
(1984) (nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel not to be applied against the United
States government); United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 104 S. Ct. 1009

(1984) (collateral estoppel does not automatically bar civil proceeding against an individual acquitted on related criminal charges).
17 Address by Justice William Rehnquist at the 75th anniversary of the University of
Florida College of Law and the Dedication of Bruton-Geer Hall (Sept. 15, 1984) (on file
at Cornell Law Review).
18 Id. at9.
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granted in the discretion of a panel of the appellate court."' 9
Shortly thereafter, Justice Rehnquist's theme was echoed by United
States Solicitor General Rex Lee, who stated that "there is nothing
in the Constitution and nothing in common sense that says that decisions of an appellate court are more likely to be right than a district court." 20 Solicitor General Lee also urged the abolition of
appeal-as-of-right. 2 ' Justice Rehnquist and Solicitor General Lee
have addressed the questions implicit in the Court's preclusion
cases: should we ever provide more than one opportunity for decisionmaking? Should we abolish appeals?
How are we (or the justices) supposed to make choices-about
whether to preclude or to permit more than one opportunity for
adjudication? Because perceptions of court overload have propelled us into structuring diverse procedural arrangements, the
question of limits-of preclusion-has particular import today and
is likely to dominate discussions of procedure for the next decade.
Below, I outline an alternative to the Supreme Court's approach to
preclusion. First, I survey procedural systems in the United States
and describe several models of decisionmaking. Thereafter, I explore features of these systems to illuminate the rationales behind
them so as to assess whether and under what circumstances redundant decisionmaking is appropriate.
The first and simplest model is what I call a "Single
Judge/Finality Model" of adjudication. The word judge here is
used as a generic to include not only judges but all adjudicators,
jurors, magistrates, arbitrators, masters, and agency hearing officers. In this model, the first tier decisionmaker issues a decision
which endures for all time. There is no appeal, no review, and no
reconsideration-ever.
The Single Judge/Finality Model was and still is, to some extent, common in the United States. In the federal courts, Congress
did not establish a statutory right of appeal independent of the
amount in controversy until 1891.22 At least one state still prohibits
appeal from its general jurisdiction court when the amount in controversy is less than $300.23 Several states also have small claims
19
20
1984,
21
22

Id. at 10.
Overend, Right to Choose Cases Called Way to Ease Caseloads, L.A. Times, Dec. 23,
Part I, at 3, col. 2 (quoting U.S. Solicitor General Rex Lee).
Id.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 permitted review in civil cases only when the amount

in controversy exceeded a specific sum; the Act made no provision for appeals in criminal cases. TheJudiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 21-22, 1 Stat. 73, 83-84. In 1891, Congress created an intermediate appellate court and permitted appeals in all cases. The
Judiciary Act of 1891 (Evarts Act), ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826.
23 W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 ("The [Supreme Court of Appeals] shall have appel-
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courts in which appeal-as-of-right is not always available. 24 Despite
many opportunities, the Supreme Court has steadfastly declined to
announce that appeal-as-of-right is constitutionally compelled. 25
And even when there is a second tier, some decisions are viewed as
solely within the prerogative of the first tier and thereby not reviewable. Many jury decisions fall within this category.
The Single Judge/Finality Model is an extreme. This model
concentrates decisionmaking power in a single individual, or set of
individuals, and provides few mechanisms to supervise such persons. Correction of error cannot occur, nor can problems of bias be
readily addressed. Consistency becomes problematic, and the possibility of developing legal norms is limited. The shortcomings of
the Single Judge/Finality Model were evidently apparent to those in
Congress who structured the three-tiered, appeal-as-of-right system to which we are accustomed today. In the 1880s, when Congress debated whether to create intermediate courts of appeal, some
members of the Congress spoke of judicial despotism and of the
need to constrain excesses of power.2 6 Those debates resulted in an
alternative model of adjudication which I call the "Single Judge plus
Limited Review Model." Today, this model dominates the procedural landscape.
The Single Judge plus Limited Review Model increases opportunities for persuasion by offering litigants a new audience. This
model provides the possibility (typically at litigants' behest) of a second decision by individuals other than the author of the first. The
model diffuses the power of the first tier. The hierarchical system
allows decisions of the second or third tier to be determinative. The
premise is either that members of the superior tier are deemed better able to pronounce, to interpret, or to understand, or that the
structure of the decisionmaking process produces better decisions.
If the second tier functions well, it has the capacity to rectify disparities and inequities produced in the first tier and to promote consislate jurisdiction in civil cases at law where the matter in controversy . . . isof greater
value or amount than three hundred dollars ....").
24
See, e.g., ASS'N OF MUN. COURT CLERKS OF CAL., SMALL CLAIMS MANUAL COMM.,
MANUAL OF PROCEDURES IN SMALL CLAIMS CASES 12-13 (1978) (judgment in small claims
court is conclusive upon plaintiff).
25 Jones v. Barnes, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 3312 (1983) ("There is, of course, no constitutional right to an appeal ....");Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-20 (1956) (once
states make appeals available, states must provide poor litigants with access to appeals).
26
E.g., 21 CONG. REC. 3404 (1890) (Mr. Culberson, of Texas, debating legislation
which became the Evarts Act, stated: "I have a supreme desire to witness. . . the overthrow and destruction of the kingly power of district and circuitjudges."). See also Hill &
Dent, Report of Committee on Judicial Administration and Remedial Procedure, 17
Rep. A.B.A. 336, 339 (1894) ("Under the [pre-1891] system, the DistrictJudge or CircuitJudge.

.

.was the anachronism of the century. ..

. He was the depository of more

arbitrary one-man power than any other official known to American public life.").
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tent norm enforcement. The Single Judge plus Limited Review
Model compromises other concerns, often thought important to a
legal system. For example, finality is delayed, although not ignored;
once an appeal is concluded, additional litigation is precluded.
However, some time and money are spent in deference to the perceived desirability of responding repeatedly to individuals'
complaints.
There are many other models of adjudication, such as the "Single Judge plus Same Judge Model" (in which the very same person
reconsiders the decision) and the "Single Judge plus Unlimited Review Model" (a de novo system). However, for purposes of this discussion, I will skip to another extreme. In a few categories of cases,
both federal and state courts, and sometimes federal and state agencies, are all authorized to participate in decisionmaking about specific issues. Two examples of such complex models are (1) litigation
under title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination on the
basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin, 27 and (2) federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction, which authorizes federal judges to consider state prisoners' claims of unconstitutional confinement. 2 8
Both of these schemes were created by Congress; both contemplate
that litigants begin in state adjudication systems, and both authorize
litigants to continue onto the federal courts.
Title VII, in particular, permits an elaborate arrangement: a litigant must first go to a state agency, then to a federal agency, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and only after both avenues have been explored may the litigant file a lawsuit in
a federal court. 29 The statute authorizes a federal court to then decide the case, 30 and the Supreme Court has interpreted this statute
to mandate de novo decisionmaking by the federal court.3 l Thus,
under title VII, a claimant may receive three factfinding decisions on
a discrimination charge. Congress set up a serial arrangement, from
state agency to federal agency to federal court. Furthermore, once
in federal court, a litigant may also seek limited appellate review
from the court of appeals and the Supreme Court.
This model is a "Single Judge/Different Forum plus Unlimited
Review Model," in which each forum may make new decisions about
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to e-5 (1982).
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982).
29 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982). The EEOC must give "substantial weight" to state
agency findings, and the EEOC decision is admissible in the federal court proceeding.
Id.
30 Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
31
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461,465 (1982) (referring to "statutory grant of de novo federal review"); Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 863 n.39
(1979).
27
28
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the same dispute. For simplicity, I denominate this model the "Different Forum Model." Unlike the Single Judge/Finality Model, the
Different Forum Model limits the power of the first tier, increases
the opportunities for litigants to persuade, and enhances the possibility of revision. On the other hand, this model substantially increases the time from the beginning of a dispute to its end, and
resource expenditures are great. In Justice Rehnquist's terms, this
model pays a price for its procedural elaborateness, for its diffusion
and reallocation of power.
Why have all these different models of adjudication? Why not
choose only one model and then adopt it uniformly? Examination
of various aspects of the models illuminates some of the reasons for
the existence of the many different models. Across procedural models, it is possible to identify common elements, differently weighted
in the various models. First, every procedural model, from the simplest Single Judge/Finality Model to the most elaborate title VII
scheme, is designed to permit individuals to be heard. These litigant
persuasion opportunities exist for at least two reasons: to provide
courts with information and to express political beliefs about the
predicates for legitimate state action against individuals. Litigant
persuasion opportunities could be conceptualized as mechanisms
for the expression of consent, were we to adopt such a theory of the
democratic state. 32 Persuasion opportunities could be understood
as providing the dialogue prerequisite to compulsion 3 3 or as the occasions upon which individuals participate in the events affecting
their lives. Whatever our political views, litigants' persuasion opportunities are centralto all procedure in the United States.
A second feature of our litigation process is litigant autonomy.
We offer individuals a great array of choices, and we believe in freedom of choice. We permit individuals to decide whether to initiate
lawsuits, how to present information, how to structure cases, and
whether to appeal. While forfeiture may be invoked as a penalty,
procedural routes are rarely mandated in advance.
Turning from litigants to decisionmakers, a third feature (common to all models) is a mechanism for allocatingdecisionmakers'power.
Most models provide for both concentration and for diffusion or reallocation of that power. Examples of power diffusion include the
jury system, put into place because of the perceived desirability of
constraining the power of the judiciary, and the appellate system,
which imposes a second layer of judges, authorized to supervise a
See M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 104-32 (1982).
See B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 347-78 (1980); see also
Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 13-14
(1979).
32
33
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lower tier's work. Sometimes power is not only diffused, but it is
also reallocated. When a second set of decisionmakers has the authority to make decisions afresh (de novo), power is shifted from the
first to the second decisionmaking body, which may even be kept
34
ignorant of the decisions of the first tier.
In part to limit the power of decisionmakers, we require them
to act in full view, to make their decisions public, and often to state
reasons for those decisions. Adjudicators must also reach conclusions impartially, free from bias and without prejudgment of the issues. Thus, fourth and fifth, we find that the features of impartiality
and visibility are talismanic of adjudication, although the techniques
for ensuring impartiality have varied substantially over time3 5 and
the rationales for why we insist on visibility have led to confusion
36
about what stages of litigation must be open to the public.
Another requirement of decisionmakers is that they act rationally to enforce public norms. We insist upon deliberate, self-conscious decisionmaking. Recently, a judge in a New York City court
flipped a coin to determine whether to sentence an individual to
twenty or thirty days in jail.3 7 The public was incensed. Although

the coin flip produced an outcome in an inexpensive and prompt
fashion, the judge was censured. His critics did not complain that
he had reached the wrong decision. Rather, they complained about
process. The coin flip offended this society's commitment to ration34 See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 218, §§ 26, 26A, 27A (Michie/Law Coop. 1974 &
Supp. 1984). The Massachusetts statute permits a defendant, charged with certain
crimes, to elect either a bench or jury trial. A defendant who opts for a bench trial
retains a right to a de novo jury trial at which the jury is not informed of the first proceeding or its outcome. See Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 104 S. Ct. 1805,
1808 (1984) (describing Massachusetts two-tier system). See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§§ 1281-82 (West 1982) (decision in nonbinding arbitration not admissible at de novo
trial).
35 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-183(c) (West Supp. 1984) (providing that
"In]o judge of any court who tried a case without ajury in which a new trial is granted,
or in which the judgment is reversed by the supreme court, may again try the case");
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 230.20 (McKinney 1982) (judge may be removed only upon
showing of good cause); Ratner, DisqualificationforJudgesfor PriorJudicialActions, 3 How.
L.J. 228, 232-38 (1957) (discussing state statutes, some of which prohibit judges who
participated at one stage of a proceeding and were reversed, from making further decisions). See also Vershen, Vicinage, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 141-42 (1977) (jurors' extrajudicial
knowledge of disputes both praised and condemned).
36 Although the Supreme Court has not held that all court proceedings must be
open to the public, the language mandating open criminal proceedings may also embrace civil cases. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-75
(1980) (holding that public has right of access to criminal court proceedings under first
and fourteenth amendments); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prod.
Antitrust Litig., 101 F.R.D. 34, 38-43 (C.D.Cal. 1984) (strong common law presumption
of public access to pretrial documents in civil proceedings).
37 See Shipp, Friess Is Barred From Ever Being New York Judge, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7,
1983, at B3, col. 1.
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ality.38 Whether or not ajudge's mental processes, when pronouncing a sentence of twenty or thirty days, actually amount to anything
more than a mental coin flip, the community wishes judicial rulings
to appear to be the product of contemplative, deliberative, cognitive
39
processes.
Turning from decisionmakers to decisionmaking, a seventh feature is finality. We hold dear the notion that our dispute resolution
can, without undue delay, issue a decision that will close debate. Yet
the tension between concentration and diffusion of power is mirrored by the tension between finality and another feature: revisionism. The importance placed upon the ability to revise decisions
comes from several sources: the hopes of correcting error, of altering outcomes because of changed circumstances, of imbuing some
decisions with more meaning by having them made repeatedly by
ever more prestigious actors, of giving individuals a sense of having
40
been fully and fairly heard.
Another procedural feature, in tension with revisionism and in
tandem with finality, is economy (sometimes described as the "administration of justice"). The goal is that the system produce results
with the least possible expenditure of dollars, energy, and time.
Economy is used here in the narrow sense of low direct costs. Resource conservation is a familiar and persistent motif in the literature of courts. Of late, as courts appear both overused and
underproductive, interest in economy has increased.
Three final features are consistency, differentiation, and ritual. Procedural systems are supposed to treat like cases alike; consistency is
the systemic analogue of the impartiality feature demanded of individual decisionmakers. Yet the many sovereignties and the geographic expanse of the United States make consistency particularly
problematic. And, in fact, we tolerate an impressive quantity of
frank legal discord. But despite its empirical absence, consistency
continues to be viewed as desirable. Consistency is in tension with
differentiation. We do not treat all cases alike, and we value treating
cases differently. Even though we espouse the notion that all litigants deserve equal access to the courts, we have long accepted restricted access and the provision of different treatment for different
kinds of disputes. Some cases are sent to administrative agencies,
others to various courts, as disputes are distinguished in terms of
38 The commission that censured the judge concluded that "[a] court of law is not a
game of chance." Id.
39 The commission explained: "The public has every right to expect that a jurist
will carefully weigh the matters at issue and, in good faith, render reasoned rulings and

decisions." Id.
40 For discussion of the utility of revisionism, see Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional
Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981).
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dollar value, nature of claim, and possible remedy or sanction. Differentiation enables us to express how much we care about categories of disputes. Legitimacy is derived from conferring
decisionmaking authority over certain issues to special subsets of
decisionmakers. Differentiation helps to identify important claims
and to sanction the outcomes in those cases as "correct," or at
"least better," than those that could be obtained without the distinctive process. Finally, there is ritual, by which I mean that adjudication in the United States has a particular stylized form and that some
of the odd etiquette and strained, formal modes of conversation are
designed to symbolize the import of the events and to sanctify the
results. These elements arefeatures, in that, at a descriptive level,
they capture the workings of procedural systems. Those features
are also values in the sense that they embody concerns about how
procedure should work. These twelve valued features of adjudication in the United States are not, indeed could not be, always viewed
as equally important. As noted, there are tensions among features,
and the theme of tension is important.
Giving full expression to one feature often limits another. For
example, consider finality and revisionism, two features of particular
relevance to this symposium. Together, they command that the system conclude its work on a dispute inexpensively yet permit occasions for error correction, supervision of the first tier, and the
possibility of reconsideration based upon changed circumstances or
views, or simply because an issue is perceived to be so important
that it should be thought about repeatedly. Finality and revisionism
cannot simultaneously be achieved. We must compromise one in
search of the other; we must decide whether to permit an individual
to be heard again or to opt instead for closure.
Two points should be made clear. First, I do not claim that
these valued features are the only concerns that drive procedural
modeling. Political concerns as well as procedural values are central
to modeling the processes for decisionmaking. For example, at
times Congress has given or taken away federal court jurisdiction in
response to the continuing struggle for power between Congress
and the courts or between the federal government and the states. 4 '
Further, it is plain that, when crafting litigation schemes, judges and
41 E.g., Act of Mar. 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44 (repealing prior act that had
authorized appeals from certain circuit court judgments to the Supreme Court), in response to the Court's ruling in Exparle McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1867). Years
later, Congress restored the Supreme Court's appellate habeas jurisdiction. Act of Mar.
3, 1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. 437; see also Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 57, § 5, 26 Stat. 827
(expanding the range of judgments directly appealable to Supreme Court); Act of Jan.
20, 1897, ch. 68, 29 Stat. 492 (noncapital criminal judgments not directly appealable to
Supreme Court).
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legislators are influenced by attitudes towards particular individuals
or categories of disputes. Decisions about habeas corpus litigation
not only express views about what procedural features are to be
stressed but also indicate beliefs about the moral worthiness of
criminal defendants and about the value of liberty. Procedures for
civil rights litigation embody choices about the import of substantive rights as well as about what shape systems of adjudication
should take.
Second, I am not suggesting that all effects of procedure are
benign. Procedure can be used as a placebo to generate a false consciousness and to hide the absence of opportunities for genuine input. Imagine appellate judges who listen carefully to each party's
arguments, ask questions, permit an opportunity for full discourse
and then produce a decision. The parties may believe that they had
a fair opportunity to present their case and therefore may be content with the decision. However, if those judges had written the
opinion long before the parties had appeared and argued, then the
oral hearing might satisfy the parties but mask the real lack of exchange, the absence of dialogue. Procedure can thus be used to enan aura of legitimacy to an
shrine the powers that be-by providing
42
impoverished decisionmaking process.
The potential for misuse of procedure exists at all times and in
all procedural models. Those who seek to reduce opportunities for
hearings, such as Justice Rehnquist and Solicitor General Lee, claim
that the reduction is necessary to combat the misuse or overuse of
process. Those who argue that greater opportunities are needed
make a parallel argument: additional procedures provide some
check on abuses, and one "cure" for the inadequacy of decisionmaking at one tier is a second hearing in another, less overloaded
forum.

43

44
Even with these caveats, identification of the twelve features
permits us to understand that the different models of procedure
exist to work out varying accommodations among the features. Spe42
Recent habeas decisions exemplify a variant of this theme. In decisions such as
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), and
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982), the Court maintained that the "great writ" was
available whenever individuals claimed to be unjustly convicted. However, the creation
of numerous procedural bars to decisions on the merits has resulted in precluding
habeas corpus review in many cases. Thus, the promise of habeas corpus has become an
empty one. Whether it will continue to have a palliative effect is unknown. See Resnik,
Tiers, 57 So. CAL. L. REV. 837, 874-963 (1984).
43
See supra note 26.
44
This list is neither exhaustive nor exclusive. Cf. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE LJ. 916, 916 (1979) (listing the eight goals of dispute resolution
systems to be finality, obedience, efficiency, availability, neutrality, conflict reduction,
and fairness).
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cific models accentuate certain features at the expense of others.
For example, in employment discrimination and prisoner cases, the
designers of the procedures have opted for greater emphasis on re45
visionism and less on finality.
The decisions of earlier decades are to be contrasted with current trends. What is plain today is that the Supreme Court prefers
simpler procedural models. In virtually all of the recent preclusion
cases, the Court has chosen procedural contraction in the name of
finality and economy. 4 6 The opinions of the Court now focus on
these two valued features, almost to the exclusion of all others. And
the result of the Court's preoccupation with economy and finality is
that a third feature, power concentration, also dominates.
Let me clarify my criticisms. I do not claim that the Supreme
Court has botched problems of statutory interpretation. The statutes (such as title VII and the habeas corpus legislation) are admittedly open-ended and indeterminate. Nor do I claim that the Court
has usurped congressional prerogatives; the Court has acted and
Congress has not (yet) affirmed or overturned those decisions.
Finally, I do not argue that the United States Constitution requires
different outcomes in those cases in which the Court has extended
the reach of preclusion doctrines.
I am claiming that the Court is very much in the business of
procedural modeling-but with attention paid only to the most limited rationales for the values that animate procedural designs. For
example, when narrowing the decisionmaking available in habeas
corpus cases, the Court has not explored the values that underlie
the complicated decisionmaking of those statutory schemes and
then determined that other value choices demand preclusion.
Rather, the Court has contented itself with conclusory references to
the adequacy of the procedures below and with hortatory discussions of the need for finality. 4 7 The Court's consistent refusal to
45 See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (discussing procedure under title
VII). For discussion of the reasons for distributing power in title VII cases among state
agencies, federal agencies, and federal courts, see Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp.,
456 U.S. 461, 470-76 (1982); id. at 494-501, 499 n.13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2391, 2513-17 (1964).
46
See, e.g., Kremer, 456 U.S. at 476-85 (noting interests of finality, efficiency, and
comity when holding preclusive in title VII litigation the decision of a state court upholding state agency's rejection of employment discrimination claim); United States v.
Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982) ("a final judgment commands respect"); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (conservation of resources is achieved by expanding res
judicata and collateral estoppel); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-33
(1979) (offensive use of collateral estoppel served interests of finality and efficiency).
47
In Frady, the Court declined habeas corpus review because a federal prisoner had
failed to object to a jury instruction at trial and to demonstrate any "actual prejudice"
resulting from the erroneous instruction. The Court commented that "[o]nce the defendant's chance to appeal has been waived or exhausted . . .we are entitled to pre-
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acknowledge valued features other than finality and economy and its
refusal to examine the reasons for the evolution of models other
than the most restrictive ones does not make the need for complexity disappear.
Finality in a dispute resolution system is a normative conclusion, not objective reality. The distribution of power in a procedural system is not only a decision about procedure but is also a
decision about political authority. Economy is not the sole purpose
of a court system, nor is it the hallmark of court systems as contrasted with other forms of decisionmaking. Coin flipping (or lotteries) would, after all, provide final and inexpensive solutions, but
would also be an offensive mechanism by which to make many decisions in this society. This Court has given the first tier a good deal
more power but the Court has not justified why the first tier should
receive a grant of such substantial, and in many instances unreviewable, authority.
Why has the Court been interpreting procedural models as narrowly as possible, so that the Single Judge/Finality Model and the
Single Judge plus Limited Review Model replace virtually all others?
There are several possible explanations. First, the Court might have
a "theory of correctness." A majority of the justices may believe
that the first tier consistently generates correct decisions. If one
were confident that the first tier produced correct outcomes in a
substantial percentage of cases, and if one perceived that the production of correct outcomes was the only purpose of procedure,
then it would be sensible to eliminate the "waste" of extra, "unnecessary" procedures. Leaving aside indeterminacy problems and my
own skepticism about correctness, 48 "correct" decisions would be
those in which the law was properly understood, the true facts uncovered, and the appropriate remedy or sanction applied.
This explanation does not withstand scrutiny. In the cases in
which the Court has precluded further decisionmaking, the Court
did not affirmatively conclude that the entity below had made the
correct decision. Rather, the Court forbade inquiry into the correctness of the decision. 4 9 Moreover, in many of these cases, the
sume he stands fairly and finally convicted .... " 456 U.S. at 164. See also Flanagan v.
United States, 104 S. Ct. 1051 (1984) (desirability of finality supports refusal to hear
appeal from disqualification of criminal defendant's counsel until after judgment is
entered).
48
Given the difficulties of reconstructing past events, the limits of individuals'
memories, and the abundant evidence of errors in cognitive judgments, I hesitate to
endorse the view that the past is captured by the adjudication process. Social scientists
have questioned human judgments for some time, e.g., R. NISBE-r & L. Ross, HUMAN
INFERENCE (1980), and legal scholars have begun to recognize the indeterminate nature
of legal rules. E.g., R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & PoLrrIcs (1975).
49 See, e.g., United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982); Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S. 107
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records before the Court gave it substantial basis for being suspicious of the first tier's decision. For example, in Kremer v. Chemical
Construction Corp., 50 the New York Human Rights Division (NYHRD),
a state agency, rejected the title VII claim of Rubin Kremer, who
had alleged that he was the victim of discrimination. In Kremer, the
Supreme Court precluded federal factfinding because a New York
state court had found that the NYHRD decision was not "arbitrary
and capricious." 5 1 However, the petitioner had cited to the Court a
New York State Bar Association report that detailed the serious deficiencies in the decisionmaking procedures of the NYHRD. This report concluded that the NYHRD was functioning very poorly, that it
kept inadequate records and made incomplete investigations. 52 In
addition, the Court was well aware that Mr. Kremer had attempted
to navigate the NYHRD and the state and federal courts without the
assistance of counsel and that Kremer had not availed himself of
procedural opportunities available to him in the agency proceeding. 53 In short, the record in Kremer gave the Court no reason to
assume that the NYHRD's decision was legally or factually correct.
Moreover, Kremer is not an isolated example. In habeas corpus
cases, the Court has often forbidden federal inquiry into the correctness of the results reached by state courts. In several of these cases,
lower federal courts had concluded that, on the merits, state courts
54
had erred when deciding issues of federal constitutional law.
Therefore, a theory of correctness does not explain the Court's
work.
A second possibility, and one for which recent decisions lend
some credence, is that some members of the present Court are hostile to certain substantive rights and use preclusion rules in service
(1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
50
456 U.S. 461 (1982).
51 Id. at 483-85.
52 Brief of Petitioner at 17, Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (quoting
N.Y. STATE BAR Assoc. JOiNT TASK FORCE, REP. OF PRAC. & PROC. OF N.Y. STATE Div.
HUM. RTs. & N.Y. STATE HUM. RTS. APPEAL BD. (1981) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE

REPORT]). The report concluded that the agency was "not satisfactorily discharging its
responsibilities under the Human Rights Law in large part due to inadequate budgetary
appropriations. Shortcomings observed by the Task Force include "poorly conducted
investigations, inadequate retention of notes, and the absence of sufficient information
to enable the Appeal Board to conduct an adequate review of no-probable-cause findings ....
" TASK FORCE REPORT at 17.
53
Noting the various opportunities for claim presentation available in the NYHRD,
456 U.S. at 479-85, the Court declined to give weight to the fact that Kremer, pro se,
had not utilized any of them. "The fact that Mr. Kremer failed to avail himself of the full
procedures provided by state law does not constitute a sign of their inadequacy." Id. at
485.
54 E.g., Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976); Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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of political ends. Two recent cases interpreting the scope of appellate review under rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 55
illustrate the plausibility of this explanation. In both cases, the
question was: what is the scope of rule 52? In Pullman-Standardv.
Swint,5 6 the Court commanded a narrow reading of rule 52 and
overturned a Fifth Circuit opinion which had concluded that the defendant corporation had, over the course of several years, intended
to discriminate in its seniority system. 57 The Supreme Court determined that the Fifth Circuit had impermissibly intruded onto the
trial court's factfinding terrain. 58 Describing Pullman-Standard's
motives when making employment assignments as a "pure question
of fact," 59 the Supreme Court concluded that the Fifth Circuit violated rule 52 when it made its own independent evaluation of the
60
evidence in the record.
61
In contrast, in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,
the Supreme Court held that rule 52 did not apply. The Bose Court
authorized appellate courts to review trial court records in first
amendment cases and to make independent assessments of whether
62
the libel standard (of malice or reckless disregard) had been met.
55
Rule 52 provides: "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the
credibility of the witnesses." FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Proposed amendments to the rule
would insulate trial judges' findings even further by providing that their factual findings,
"whether based on oral or documentary evidence," could not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous. Judicial Conference of the United States, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4 (Sept. 1984) (on file at the Cornell Law Review). The
Advisory Committee explained that some courts have applied the "clearly erroneous"
standard only to findings based on a witness' demeanor and credibility. Id. at 5-6. The
Advisory Committee justified the proposed change because of the "public interest in
.. .stability and judicial economy." Id. at 6.
In an earlier draft, the Committee had recommended that the language of the rule
should state expressly that the scope was redefined because of the "need for finality."
Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 338, 359 (1983).
56 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
57 In Pullman-Standard,the trial judge had compiled a chart, summarizing the data
(largely documentary) relating to the question of discriminatory seniority systems in employment in the company. Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 539 F.2d 77, 85-86 (5th Cir.
1976). The Fifth Circuit described this chart as "the heart" of the trial judge's conception of the case, id., and concluded that, although the chart's factual content was not
"clearly erroneous," its structure was legally deficient. Id. at 89. The case was then
retried, and, on a second appeal, the Fifth Circuit again concluded that the trial judge
had erred. In the appellate court's view, "the total employment picture indicates that
departmental assignments continued to be infected with racial considerations ....
Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525, 529 (5th Cir. 1980).
58 456 U.S. at 287.
59 Id. at 287-88.
60
Id. at 285-86.
61
104 S.Ct. 1949 (1984).
62 Id. at 1959.
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How is it possible that, given the very same rule 52, appellate courts
can inquire into the state of mind of writers or publishers accused of
libel (and protect them), but cannot inquire into the state of mind of
corporations accused of employment discrimination (and find them
culpable)? Pullman-Standard, like Kremer, involves a discrimination
claim. In both cases, the request for additional procedure came
from the party who claimed to be a discrimination victim. By giving
preclusive effect to the first tier's decision, the Court protected the
alleged discriminator. In contrast, Bose is a first amendment case,
and there the Court permitted plenary review of the first tier's decision. Perhaps the Court cares less about discrimination claimants
and more about first amendment defendants.
This political explanation is borne out in other cases as well.
The Court cannot be oblivious to the fact that, in both civil and
criminal cases, virtually all the "losers" of procedural opportunities
are prisoners and civil rights litigants. 6 3 Further, should the Court
wish to overlook this trend, one of its membersJustice Stevens, has
begun to remind the Court of the impact of its decisions. In Patton
v. Yount, for example, Justice Stevens commented that the case
marked a "string of consecutive victories for the prosecution" that
then stood "at 20."64 Furthermore, in the rare instances when the
Court permits more procedural opportunities, the "winner" is often
the government, and particularly the United States. For example,
despite the strong trend toward cutting back litigation opportunities
and the growing strength of the "one-shot" rule, the Court has denied criminal defendants' double jeopardy claims6 5 and has permitted forfeiture actions after acquittals. 6 6 Moreover, in United States v.
Mendoza,67 the Court created a special exception to the nonmutual
collateral estoppel rule for the federal government. 6 8 Thus, the
63 See supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text; see also Tate v. Rose, 104 S. Ct.
2186, 2187 (1984) (O'Connor, CircuitJustice) (staying a grant of habeas corpus ordered
by the Sixth Circuit, the Justice concluded that the balance of hardships between the
state and the individual favored the state; the Justice stated that "granting the stay for
the time necessary to consider petition should not cause a significant incremental burden to respondent, who has been incarcerated for several years, but doing so will relieve
the State of Ohio of the burden of releasing respondent or retrying him").
64 104 S. Ct. 2885, 2900 n.8 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65 Ohio v.Johnson, 104 S. Ct. 2536, 2542 (1984) (guilty plea to some charges does
not bar further prosecution on related charges); Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 47 (1982)
(double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial when reversal is based upon weight of
evidence).
66 United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 104 S. Ct. 1099, 1107 (1984)
(acquittal from charges of dealing in firearms without license does not preclude the government from commencing forfeiture action to obtain firearms).
67 104 S. Ct: 568 (1984).
68 Id. at 574 (nonmutual collateral estoppel not enforceable against federal government). Cf. United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 104 S. Ct. 575, 578 (1984) (no special

estoppel rule for United States when estoppel is mutual).
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government may be permitted multiple chances to litigate but the
rest of us are not. The Court's work in this area may be explained
by hostility towards certain categories of rights and to the individuals claiming them.
A final explanation for the Court's reduction of decisionmaking
opportunities is that the Court may believe in the Single
Judge/Finality and Single Judge plus Limited Review Models. The
Court may, as a matter of principle, view those models as sufficient
to make decisions (be they right or wrong) and to express society's
concern for individuals. Here again, I think this idea has some explanatory force. The Court's opinions openly express a preference
for finality, both as a means to conserve resources and as a desirable
psychological state. 69 On several occasions, the Court praises the
lower tiers and appears willing to give great power to their
70
members.
If the Court does believe that these limited models suffice, then,
in my view, the Court is wrong. Although these models produce
outcomes, in many instances there are reasons to doubt the correctness and legitimacy of those outcomes. Further, although procedure exists to provide outcomes, procedure also serves nonoutcome
related functions-to instruct about and to act out the political system, to legitimate decisions of the state, to dignify the participants,
and to make meaningful the interaction between individuals and the
state. 7 1 Procedure has a normative, political function. Therefore,
while a judge or agency hearing officer may make a "good" decision, I am troubled by the Court's tendency in this self-described
liberal democratic state to invest so much power in a single individual. Such allocations of power are particularly distasteful when, as
in Kremer, first tier decisionmakers were poorly-funded, ill-equipped,
and operating under oppressive conditions.
The information gains over the last forty years have not only
69 See Spalding v. Aiken, 103 S. Ct. 1795, 1797 (1983) (Burger, CJ., statement concerning denial of certiorari) (The Chief Justice, urging that additional limitations be
placed on the writ of habeas corpus, argued that prisoners need to know that they have
no additional avenues so as to accept the fact of conviction and "'make peace' with
society.").
70 E.g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 478 (1982); United States
v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 154-65 (1982).
71 See P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 8-9 (1976)
(importance of ritual and "process imperatives"); R. COVER & 0. Fiss, THE STRUCTURE
OF PROCEDURE (1979) (procedure as a social, cultural institution); 18 NoMos, DUE PROCESS (J. Pennock &J. Chapman eds. 1977) (collection of essays explaining nature and

rationale of procedural fairness); Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor AdministrativeAdjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value,
44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 49-52 (1976) (importance of dignitary concerns); Michelman, The
Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights-Part1, 1973 DUKE
LJ. 1153, 1172-77 (dignity, participation, deterrence, effectuation as litigation values).
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been about the number of cases filed and decided. We have also
learned a good deal on both empirical and anecdotal fronts. Researchers have turned their attention to decisionmaking in agencies
and courts and to the interaction between attorneys and clients.
What we now know is not very reassuring. Reports about trial
courts expose the many burdens and pressures under which trial
judges labor; 72 some New York City courts "dispose" of 100 cases a
day. 73

Investigations of agencies, such as the New York Human

Rights Division and the Social Security Administration, reveal inadequate processes, erratic decisionmaking, lack of resources, and administrative malfunctioning. 74 Solicitor General Lee was mistaken
when he said that there is "nothing in... common sense" 75 to prefer the decision of three people with time for reflection over the
decision of one person with little or no time to think. Descriptions
of attorney-client relationships are equally, if not more, distressing. 76 In some areas, such as criminal defense of the indigent, we

know that the image of an attorney and client as a "moral unit" 77 is
a mirage. The funding of public defender programs has been inadequate and the result has been too few lawyers to service too many
clients-leading in turn to substandard representation in some
78
cases.
The redundancy built into schemes like title VII was not accidental; the drafters understood the possible deficiencies in the first
tier. That model of dedsionmaking was created to respond to concerns about power diffusion, as well as power concentration, about
revisionism, as well as finality, and about the division of responsibility between state and federal systems. The designers of title VII
72

See generally V. FLANGO, R.

ROPER

& M.

COURTS, THE BUSINESS OF STATE TRIAL COURTS

ELSNER, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE

67 (1983).

73 See The Criminal Court: A System of Collapse, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1983, at 1, col. 1;
id., June 28, 1983, at B2, col. I (E.R. Shipp, The Prosecutor; M.A. Farbor, TheJudge); id.,
June 30, 1983, at 1, col. 3 (E.R. Shipp, How Criminal Court Fails: The 8 Key Areas).
74
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 52; J. MASHAW, C. GOETZ, F. GOODMAN, W.
SCHWARZ, P. VERKUIL & M. CARROW, SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS: A STUDY
OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION HEARING SYSTEM

75

126-30 (1978).

Overend, supra note 20, at 28.
76 Criticism of attorneys' performance has been robust, and the Chief Justice has
stressed the need for improvements. Burger, Annual Report on the State of theJudiciary)1980, 66 A.B.A. J 295, 296 (1980). See also N. LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES
FOR THE POOR 19 (1982) (survey of criminal defense programs found that inadequate
compensation caused attorneys to be unwilling to put forth effort necessary on behalf of
clients); Genego, The Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel: PerformanceStandards and Competent Representation, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 181, 202-03 (1984).
77 Cover & Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE LJ.
1035, 1078-86 (1977).
78 N. LEFSTEIN, supra note 76; Comment, Client Services in a Defender Organization: The
PhiladelphiaExperience, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 448, 450, 468-69 (1969) (discussing consequences of excessive case load).
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were concerned-in my view, understandably-about vesting sole
factfinding authority in state agency decisionmakers. The statutory
solution was to permit additional, albeit expensive, occasions for
factfinding. In contrast, in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., the
Supreme Court imbued a single individual in the NYHRD with definitive authority, absent "arbitrary [or] capricious" behavior 79 or a
litigant sophisticated enough to have read the Kremer opinion and
80
figure out how to avoid its res judicata trap.
Why give such power to agency officials? Do we have any reason to place complete trust in their competency? Compare that
decisionmaking process to the paradigm of the Single
Judge/Finality Model in this country: the jury. The jury system
compromises revisionism in exchange for the legitimacy of decisions
made by a group of carefully selected citizens. The strong ritualistic
elements of a jury decision provide solace; the number of decisionmakers counteracts individual biases. If not "correct," we believe jurors' decisions are "better" because they express community
values.8 1 Consequently, revisionism seems less important.
In contrast, judicial decisionmakers do not come with as strong
an imprimatur of legitimacy, and agency decisions are equally, if not
more, suspect. We have no reason to believe that such decisionmakers are always wise and just, that they capture community
sentiment or render accurate decisions. Further, I assume that
"correctness" itself is, to twentieth century sensibilities, a highly
problematic concept. Are the tales of alleged wrongdoing retold accurately? Can one construct a theory of what it means to say that a
corporation, a fictional entity, "intended" to discriminate over a
course of years against a group of people? And assuming, for the
moment, that we could "know" the "truth," what are the appropriate responses? Sanctions? Remedies? Yet, even if I decline to embrace a theory of determinant correctness, I can embrace a theory of
79
This is the standard employed by the New York appellate court which reviewed
the agency decision. 456 U.S. at 464. For alternative readings of title VII, see the dissents filed by Justices Blackmun, id. at 486, and Stevens, id. at 508.
80
Under the opinion, preclusion occurs only whan a litigant appeals a state agency
decision to a state court. 456 U.S. at 466-76. Thus, had Kremer ignored the form provided by the agency (explaining how to appeal to state court) and not sought review in
the state court, his case would have been heard in federal court. 456 U.S. at 476-78.
81 See Ford v. Kentucky, 53 U.S.L.W. 3338, 3339 (1984) (denying cert. to Ford v.
Kentucky, 665 S.W.2d 304 (Ky. 1983)) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall
commented:
Law is not a process by which a society actually arrives at objective truth,
but rather a means for structuring the truth-seeking process so that the
answers it yields will be accepted as morally legitimate by the community;
it is this acceptance that enables the verdicts of the jury system to be
treated as "true."
Id. at 3339.
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error. And by error, I mean two kinds of wrongs: the wrong way in
this society to make a decision, and the wrong outcome on the basis
of the information known. Both kinds of errors can be found in
many first tier decisions, and the question becomes how we should
respond. We could decide that we cannot afford to do better. The
Court seems to be telling us this-to live with decisions, and further,
to respect those results, regardless of what we know about the poverty of the process that produced them.
I protest that conclusion. Instead of taking this route, I believe
the Court should reevaluate the weight given to various procedural
features. For example, in lieu of stressing economy and finality, the
Court should emphasize differentiation. The Court should identify
subsets of cases by the kinds of claims involved, the nature of the
decisionmaking entity, the identity of the parties, or the resources of
the parties, and then permit additional decisionmaking in certain areas. To the Court's credit, it has taken this approach in a few cases.
In United States v. Mendoza,82 the Court shaped special rules reflective
of the distinct nature of one of the litigants. 8 3 In Bose v. Consumers
Union,84 the Court created a particular rule in light of the nature of
the issue.8 5 In contrast, the Court's refusal in Kremer to contemplate
the unique nature of title VII, the Court's unwillingness in PullmanStandard to face the indeterminacies of so-called "factual findings"
in mammoth discrimination cases, and the Court's dogged pursuit
of preclusion in habeas cases are its failures. All cases, from death
penalty to car crashes, should not be decided with the same quantum of procedure. The Court has not paid sufficient attention to
differentiation.
Second, the Court must reconsider the esteem in which it holds
the feature of litigant autonomy, which often translates as attorney
autonomy, which in turn means that a litigant is stuck with whatever
his or her lawyer does or does not do.8 6 Many lawyers are simply
inadequate, and consequently our fidelity to rugged individualism
may have become counterproductive. In criminal cases, we can no
longer afford to live with self-guided, unguided or attorney-misguided litigants. We should consider frank (but rule-bound) state
control over more of the litigation process to narrow the choices
104 S. Ct. 568 (1984).
83 Id. at 572-74 (holding that nonmutual collateral estoppel did not apply to
government).
84 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984).
85 Id. at 1865.
86 For example, in habeas cases, the Supreme Court attributes attorney failures to
make claims to be clients' deliberate decisions to "sandbag" proceedings. See Resnik,
supra note 42, at 895-98.
82
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permitted to litigants and their attorneys.8 7 We might, for example,
make certain pretrial motions obligatory.
Third, the Court should develop sensitivity to the diversity of
the first tier. Given the increasingly broad range of adjudicatory
models, the Court should not simply assume that first tier decisionmaking occurs in a context that legitimates the decisions rendered.
Rather, the Court should inquire into the nature of the decisionmaking process to determine whether any of the valued features of
adjudication are present. For example, are there mechanisms in a
given scheme to ensure rational norm enforcement? Are there
checks for impartiality? Are there reasons to be suspicious of the
outcomes?8 8 The Court must recognize that, with the high volume
of cases and the relatively minimal resources invested in running
agency and court adjudication systems, many first tiers are populated by overworked, underpaid individuals, whose jobs do not provide the prestige that compensates for the unremittent demands and
the difficult conditions. In an occasional opinion, such as Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 8 9 the Court has expressed some willingness to
scrutinize the adequacy of agency decisionmaking.9 0 By and large,
however, the Court has ignored complaints of inadequate process
and endorsed first tier decisionmaking regardless of the weaknesses
delineated.9 1
Justice Rehnquist, in his speech in Florida, has raised the right
question. A coherent evolution of this Court's jurisprudence is to
consider the abolition of appeals. I have no quarrel with Justice
Rehnquist's question. I am, however, deeply distressed by the
Court's answers in the preclusion cases. The issues are not easy.
Whether the decisionmakers are called "judges," 'jurors," "administrative hearing officers," "arbitrators" or "magistrates," the issue
is how much power to give them and why. The Court's superficial
87

I have previously expressed concern over aggressive judicial control of litigation.

Resnik, MangerialJudges,96 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982). If we were to abandon litigant

autonomy we would have to provide exacting safeguards to protect against inappropriate judicial action.
88 Cf. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of theJudiciaryAct of 1789: The
Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1540-42 (1984) (foreign admiralty
decrees were not held conclusive because of suspicion that vessels were being falsely
condemned as nonneutral).
89 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
90 Id. at 428-33 (reversing decision by Illinois courts, which had barred claim be-

cause an official of Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission had inadvertently
scheduled a conference after the statutory time to hold such a meeting had expired).
91

See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066-67 (1984) ("strong pre-

sumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance"; refusing to overturn convictions even when counsel's behavior is "unrea-

sonable" unless defendant can also show resulting prejudice); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481-85 (1982).
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finality/economy gloss obscures the deeper, and admittedly more
difficult, questions.
There are no simple, inexpensive answers nor any solutions
that are problem free. The history of procedure is a series of attempts to solve the problems created by the preceding generation's
procedural reforms. The 1930s, 1940s, 1950s and 1960s gave us liberal rules of pleading and eased access to the courts, which today
have resulted in a high volume of litigation.9 2 The current "solution" of finality, achieved by enshrining first decisions and by precluding review, is premised upon a fiction that the first tier's
evaluations of disputes are sufficient to fulfill all the purposes of
procedure. Those close to agencies and courts know that, while
there are many first tier successes, there are many failures as well. If
we are committed to features of court procedure other than power
concentration, finality, and economy, then we must permit more opportunities for revisionism. I invite the reader to see the continuum
between res judicata, collateral estoppel, and appeal, and to understand that the Supreme Court (in its preclusion jurisprudence and
elsewhere) is leading us towards the abolition of various forms of
redundancy in decisionmaking, including appeals. I invite the
reader to question the desirability of imposing the Single
Judge/Finality and Single Judge plus Limited Review models across
the litigation spectrum.
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Of course, many other factors were at work, including the population growth, the
growing number of attorneys, and a dramatic rise in federal legislation which in turn
authorized or begat more litigation. For historical and statistical analyses of litigation
rates in one jurisdiction, see M. SELVIN & P. EBENER, MANAGING THE UNMANAGEABLE: A
HISTORY OF CIVIL DELAY IN THE Los ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT (1984).

